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 
Abstract— The lack of interoperability between Pay-TV 
service providers and a horizontally integrated business 
transaction model have compromised the competition in the Pay-
TV market. In addition, the lack of interactivity with customers 
has resulted in high churn rate and improper security measures 
have contributed into considerable business loss. These issues are 
the main cause of high operational costs and subscription fees in 
the Pay-TV systems. As a result, this paper presents the Mobile 
Conditional Access System (MICAS) as an end-to-end access 
control solution for Pay-TV systems. It incorporates the mobile 
and broadcasting systems and provides a platform whereby 
service providers can effectively interact with their customers, 
personalise their services and adopt appropriate security 
measurements. This would result in the decrease of operating 
expenses and increase of customers’ satisfaction in the system. 
The paper provides an overview of state-of-the-art conditional 
access solutions followed by detailed description of design, 
reference model implementation and analysis of possible MICAS 
security architectures. 
 
Index Terms— Pay-TV, Conditional Access System, Mobile, 
Set-top box.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE consumption of TV is very much transformed from a 
social viewing to become more personalised. The TV 
consumption is more objective now; as such viewers expect to 
ubiquitously access their favourite programmes. The TV 
viewers demand for a range of services in the competitive 
prices and freedom of choice to switch to any programmes or 
service providers with the least cost, as and when they wish. 
Such trends can be abstracted in the following statement: the 
interoperability, affordability, interactivity, personalisation and 
security are becoming the main key elements in the Pay-TV 
business model. These factors have been evolved with the 
technology and demand.  
The service providers on the other hand have been always 
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interested in proprietary solutions when it comes to the 
security and commercial issues. They are interested in a cost-
effective solution to regularly update the system, handle the 
installation process, promptly respond to malicious activities 
and interact effectively to retain their customers.  
There has always been a trade-off between service providers’ 
and viewers’ expectations in the traditional Pay-TV systems. 
Tackling the interoperability issue has been the main objective 
in the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) conditional access 
protocols (Simulcrypt [2] and Multicrypt [3]), though owing to 
technical and commercial reasons, they have not gained wide 
acceptance in the DTV market. Issues like increasing the 
bandwidth requirement, security, sharing the platform in the 
Simulcrypt and higher cost and complexity in the Multicrypt 
are also amongst the pitfalls of DVB protocols. Nevertheless, 
solutions like downloadable CA system [4] or using a common 
smart-card-based CA system have been proposed to mitigate 
the inherent issues such as the control relationship and 
encouraging private CA systems. Introduction of more 
intelligent and resourceful smartcards (i.e. Java Card) has also 
evolved the DVB protocols supporting more dynamic features 
in the access control mechanism [5]. All the same, the 
solutions have not taken into account the actual requirements 
in the enhanced Pay-TV systems where ever evolving 
customers’ interest shall equally be treated as service 
providers’. Such requirements necessitate a return channel in 
the DTV system architecture which is capable of promoting 
the personalisation concept. Thus, the best to-date bi-
directional communication channel is the GSM network, which 
is not only secured, but also popular in the world. It owns a 
security element (SIM card) which can ultimately be 
considered as a replacement for the smartcard technology in 
the Pay-TV system. It supports various software and hardware 
features that are required to implement a scalable CA solution. 
The cooperation of mobile technology with the broadcasting 
system is considered for the first time herein as an end-to-end 
access control solution in Pay-TV systems. The paper presents 
full aspects of the novel Mobile Integrated Conditional Access 
System (MICAS) to prove the concept that it can provide a 
scalable platform to offer interoperability, wider range of 
interactive services, higher security and more affordable 
services. Various use case scenarios and security structures are 
presented to highlight the design aspects of MICAS. A 
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business collaboration structure is proposed followed by a 
reference model implementation. Then, respective security 
architectures are analysed versus security vulnerabilities, 
system complexity and set-top box production costs. Finally, 
the conclusion is drawn out. 
II. GENERAL PAY-TV SYSTEM 
The Pay-TV CA system usually consists of the two following 
subsystems: 
1) The Scrambling Subsystem: This is responsible for 
scrambling the signal at the head-end and descrambling it 
at the receiver-end; 
2) The Control Access Subsystem: This processes access 
control messages to determine whether descrambling must 
be performed. The DVB project has defined two 
conditional access messages namely the Entitlement 
Control Message (ECM) and Entitlement Management 
Message (EMM) [6]. 
The ECM is restricted to 256 Bytes and usually consists of 
three fields. The first field contains the access parameters. The 
access parameters define the conditions under which access to 
a program is allowed. The service provider can use this field to 
leverage; such as local control (i.e. using a parental rating 
system) and geographical black out (i.e. domestic channels). 
The second field contains an encrypted Control Word (CW) 
and the last field contains a data integrity check.  
The EMMs are transmitted in advance in order to give 
access to the authorised subscribers. In broadcast-only 
environment, the transmission of a conditional access message 
needs to be repeated to make sure that set-top boxes will 
descramble contents on time and according to the subscriber’s 
entitlement. Such a requirement is handled by the EMM 
Injector, which schedules the EMMs to be transferred to the 
receivers in time before the start of associated programmes. 
The EMMs are addressed to subscribers using their unique and 
group smart card addresses. The EMMs can be delivered 
either via broadcasting medium along with ECMs and digital 
contents or via interaction channels (i.e. phone line). 
The size of EMM is restricted to 256 Bytes and usually 
consists of four fields. Each EMM starts with an address field 
associated to a specific set-top box. There are usually two 
addressing modes: one for an individual set-top box and one 
for a group of set-top boxes. The second field is the 
subscriber’s entitlements and the third field is the encrypted 
service keys. The last field is for the data integrity check.  
There may be different applications for the EMMs. For 
instance, it can also be used to send a command to set-top 
boxes. Additionally, it can be used as a ‘Unique EMM’ to send 
activation and key update messages to a single subscriber or it 
can be used as a ‘Group EMM’ to send a cryptographic key 
associated to an event (i.e. tennis match) to a group of 
subscribers, who have paid for the event.  
The subscriber is identified using its smart card unique 
address or group address. The user smart card presents its 
address to the set-top box during initialisation. The set-top box 
uses this address to filter and acquire corresponding EMMs. 
The EMMs are then delivered to the user smart card. The user 
smart card decrypts the EMMs and updates its memory based 
on the information conveyed by the EMMs. This information 
is used at the user smart card to decrypt the ECMs and retrieve 
CWs. The user smart card delivers the CWs and initiates the 
descrambling of contents.  
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 present the processes that usually take place 
at the transmitter and receiver sides respectively, in a general 
Pay-TV system. 
 
Fig. 1: The head-end structure in a general Pay-TV system 
 
Fig. 2: The receiver-end structure in a general Pay-TV system 
III. ENHANCED CA SOLUTIONS 
There are still fundamental issues in the Pay-TV systems yet 
to be resolved. These inherited issues can be categorised as 
follows:  
1) Lack of interoperability between CA systems and 
vertically integrated transaction model which scales down 
the business for a newcomer either as a service provider, 
set-top box producer or CA provider; 
2) Inefficient usage of bandwidth for transferring CA 
messages and high complexity of the system due to the 
synchronisation issues and nature of the network 
(unidirectional) used in the traditional broadcasting 
systems; 
3) High administration and operational costs, and high 
security flaw costs will cause more expensive subscription 
fees and together with lack of interactivity and 
personalised services will decrease satisfaction level of 
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subscribers.  
Such inherited issues can be expressed as commercial 
requirements and technologies used in the traditional Pay-TV 
and broadcasting systems. Nowadays, with the advent of the 
technology especially in the digital communication systems 
(i.e. convergence of telecom and broadcasting systems), 
interactivity, mobility and personalisation features can be 
added to Pay-TV services. The Internet and mobile networks 
are now widely available connecting the whole world together. 
Therefore, it is expected that information and multimedia 
services can be delivered ubiquitously. The following 
subsections consider the abovementioned issues and propose 
high-level solutions to resolve the mobility and interoperability 
in the Pay-TV systems. 
A. Cooperating broadcast and Internet CA system 
The Internet is a publicly accessible series of interconnected 
computer networks connecting large geographical areas 
together. Therefore, it can be effectively used to connect 
service providers and viewers. In this case, the requisite 
information that helps the service provider to identify a 
subscriber and his set-top box can be sent over the Internet. 
The set-top box can be identified via its secured and unique 
identity number (i.e. MAC address or IP address) and the 
subscriber can be identified either through a 
challenge/response process or through his public digital 
signature. The service provider can put the subscriber’s 
signature or any security related information in a secure 
website in the Internet domain. The subscriber then can log 
into his account for instance via his set-top box and download 
his signature to sign the subscription request(s).  
Fig. 3 shows the overall architecture of the cooperating 
Internet and broadcast conditional access system.  
 
Fig. 3: The reference model for Internet integrated CA system 
B. Cooperating broadcast and GSM CA system  
The GSM network with billions of subscribers is a popular 
and secure network which has been recognised as a potential 
return channel in broadcasting systems. Every GSM subscriber 
has a mobile phone operating with a SIM card. The SIM card 
which is bound to the subscriber provides a secure, 
programmable and remotely accessible platform. If the mobile 
operator grants the permission, the SIM can be used to store 
and deploy conditional access mechanisms. Hence, it can be 
considered as an alternative to the smartcard. The result of this 
replacement could be the emergence of more affordable set-
top boxes.  
In addition, incorporating mobile technologies can also 
extend mobility features in broadcasting systems so that the 
subscriber no longer needs to be at home and at the vicinity of 
a pre-selected set-top box to enjoy his/her entitlements. The 
one-to-one rigid relationship between an authorised subscriber 
and his set-top box can be adjusted, if the service provider 
could uniquely identify the subscriber and his set-top box so to 
ultimately prevent any anticipatory repudiation and piracy. In 
this approach, the subscriber can be identified through a 
challenge/response authentication process or via his 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (IMSI) or 
mobile number stored in his SIM card. His mobile phone can 
be identified by its International Mobile Equipment Identity 
(IMEI) and his location can be recognised by Location 
Identifier (LI) stored in the SIM card. His set-top box can be 
identified for instance using a unique identity number assigned 
by its manufacturer. It is worthwhile mentioning that the set-
top box identity number and smartcard unique (or group) 
addresses are already used by service providers for 
authentication and access control purposes.  
Fig. 4 shows the architecture of the mobile integrated 
conditional access system (MICAS) in Pay-TV systems. 
 
Fig. 4: The reference model for GSM integrated CA system 
In the next generations of GSM technology (i.e. GPRS, 
UMTS, LTE and etc.) services like WAP access, SMS and 
Internet communication services such as email and web access 
are available to mobile users. Therefore, the previous solutions 
can be amalgamated together to form a GPRS integrated CA 
system in the broadcasting system. Its great advantage is the 
higher security level that can be established, for instance 
through the WAP protocol and IP-Sec.  
Similar to the previous approaches, the subscriber can be 
identified through his mobile phone’s IMSI number or IP 
address and the set-top box can be identified via its unique IP 
address or its equipment identity number or MAC address. The 
registration and identification processes can also be executed 
similarly.  
All in all, the Internet-only architecture will neither decrease 
the overall production cost of the set-top box nor improve 
mobility, nor personalisation in the Pay-TV system.  
Moreover, the emergence of PC-based access to IPTV services 
possibly compromise commercial take-up of the proposed 
architecture. On the other hand, the mobile-based solution (i.e. 
GSM or GPRS solutions) can possibly reduce the overall cost 
of the set-top box by at least replacing the smartcard in the set-
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top box with the SIM card in the mobile phone. These 
solutions will also provide a flexible platform to improve 
mobility and personalised services in the Pay-TV system. 
Also, it distinguishes itself from Mobile-TV CA systems [20] 
as it cooperates with a set-top box to enable the viewer to 
watch TV programmes on a TV screen. Therefore, amid the 
proposed architectures, the mobile integrated solution is 
considered herewith as a primary and novel approach to be 
analysed further. The functional requirements are elicited in 
the next section, followed by describing various architectural 
models of the system.  
IV. MICAS DESIGN 
The MICAS encompasses various security architectures 
concerning the distribution of entitlements and access key 
information to the viewers. Following a brief description of 
MICAS use-cases, the security architectures will be detailed. 
A. Functional requirements - Use case scenarios 
The service provider needs to provide the MICAS services 
on new type of set-top boxes and sign an agreement with 
mobile phone operators to use their SIM cards. The set-top 
box identity (STB_ID) can be used by the service provider to 
authenticate the set-top box and identify the model and 
specifications of the set-top box.  
The viewer on the other hand has to set up his TV services’ 
access point in order to benefit from the services offered in the 
MICAS. Given that the set-top box is receiving the encoded 
streams, the viewer can subscribe to any available services 
using an arbitrary set-top box and his mobile phone. The 
corresponding service provider will manage the subscriber’s 
account and provide him with a proper mechanism to decode 
the paid contents. 
Fig. 5 presents possible use case packages defined in the 
MICAS. Each package is now briefly explained. 
 
Fig. 5: The use-case packages defined in the MICAS 
1) Set-up connection: the set-top box shall provide the 
viewer with appropriate service-menus to connect his mobile 
phone to the set-top box via the Bluetooth link. The viewer 
needs to activate the Bluetooth and bind his mobile phone to 
the set-top box for enjoying MICAS features.  
2) Sign-up: The ultimate goal would be to enable the viewer 
to purchase a range of services (i.e. subscriber TV, pay-per-
view) from different service providers.  
The set-top box shall display the list of discovered TV 
services (i.e. Electronic Service Guide) for the viewer and 
enable the viewer to browse and select them on the TV screen 
using a remote control.   
3) Set local control: The viewer may consider his criteria to 
filter some channels (programmes) which are unsuitable for 
the rest of the family (i.e. children). The local control 
preferences can be set (or reset) during or after the 
subscription process. The local control preferences can be set 
in two following levels:  
‘Rating-based Control’: complies with the motion picture 
rating system based on violence, substance abuse and etc. 
‘Service-based Control’: allows the viewer to set a password 
on channels or programmes based on his criteria. In this case, 
when he orders a service, he shall specify whether the service 
is authorised for social viewing (all family members) or it is a 
personal choice protected for instance by a password (i.e. PIN 
number).  
4) Subscribe to multi-room service: It extends the personal 
viewing and in this case, the viewer has to choose one of his 
set-top boxes as a server and initiate the ‘sign-up’ process. The 
viewer then needs to physically connect (i.e. through USB or 
serial interface) and register the rest of his set-top boxes (as 
clients) with the server. The registration can be pursued by 
retrieving the client identifier (Client-ID). In the end, the list of 
client(s) will be shown to the viewer and enclosed within the 
viewer’s order to keep the service provider abreast of the 
receiver side configuration. The ‘multi-room service’ can be 
opted during the ‘sign-up’ procedure.  
5) Subscriber to Follow Me service: This allows a 
subscriber to ubiquitously access his entitlements. This service 
will manifest the ‘Anything Anytime Anywhere’ paradigm. It 
is particularly suitable for viewers who spend most of their 
time in travelling and tend to have the habit of targeted 
viewing (i.e. sport or news programmes).  
The viewer can sign up for the service through an arbitrary 
set-top box connected to the viewer’s mobile phone for 
instance via the Bluetooth connection. The requested service 
message can be sent via the return channel to the service 
provider. The message shall include sufficient information to 
enable the service provider to identify the viewer, set-top box 
and the CASS already assigned to the viewer.  
6) Amend subscription: When a viewer applies for the 
amendment or cancellation of his subscription, the security 
applications (if any) installed in the viewer’s mobile phone 
and/or set-top box shall transit to the suspension state, waiting 
for the service provider’s command to function. The service 
provider may react according to the contractual terms followed 
by updating the viewer’s subscription profile. Updated Key 
information shall be sent to the viewer in case that he requests 
for subscription amendment and CA subsystem shall be 
disabled if he cancels the policy.  
7) Subscriber account management: In the conditional 
access system proposed in DVB project, the Subscriber 
Management Subsystem (SMSS) is responsible for managing 
subscribers’ information. The MICAS will remain compatible 
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with the SMSS while mitigating the overall responsibilities of 
the operator and improving the information management 
system.  In the MICAS, the Information System (IS) is semi-
automatic as a great part of the viewer-related data is acquired 
through the GSM interface. Other parts are developed as the 
viewer builds up his history in the system. The viewer’s data 
shall consist of the viewer’s personal details (i.e. full name, 
address and bank account information), GSM identity (i.e. 
IMSI and IMEI), STB_ID, subscription, preferences, payment 
history and etc.  
 8) Order management: The order management is an 
intricate and automatic process subject to the successful 
validation of the order and involved entities (i.e. viewer, 
mobile phone and set-top box). The service provider will 
create or update the viewer’s account wherein all the 
information concerning the viewer is saved. The order has to 
be forwarded to the billing section. If banking transactions are 
authorised successfully, the service provider will process the 
viewer’s order.  
9) Billing process: The service provider issues the bill based 
on the viewer’s subscription profile and contracted tariff. The 
bill shall be issued prior to the service, and if there is any 
change of fee, the service provider shall inform the viewer in 
advance. The viewer can set-up the payment method during 
the ‘signing up’. 
10) Download CASS: Given that all validation processes on 
the viewer identity and set-top box succeeded, the service 
provider shall start deploying his tailored conditional access 
subsystem in the viewer’s SIM card and/or set-top box through 
the GSM network [7]. The conditional access subsystem 
(CASS) shall at least consist of cryptographic Keys and a 
series of security software applications (APIs).  
11) Security check: The service provider, set-top box 
producer together with the mobile phone operator shall limit 
the capability of the end-user in terms of accessing, inserting 
and installing new Keys or APIs into the security sensitive 
domains (SIM card or set-top box). Moreover, the service 
provider shall effectively interact with receiver-end and 
monitor the viewer’s behaviour throughout the contract. 
Analysing the security data will also enable the service 
provider to evaluate the viewer’s risk (i.e. user modelling 
techniques). In case that a threat is imminent, the CASS 
operating in the mobile phone and/or set-top box shall be 
automatically halted from operation. The service provider shall 
evaluate the situation and take appropriate action such as 
logging the situation, updating/revoking the Key and etc.  
12) Personalised services and advertisement: in the 
MICAS, the sales and marketing can become more intelligent.  
The service provider can contact viewers on their mobile 
phones for instance to gather viewer’s preferences and build 
up the viewer’s profile online. The service provider can 
process such personalisation information using various 
individual or social modelling techniques (i.e. cognitive 
modelling and social interaction) to personalise his services for 
individuals or group of viewers. The service provider shall 
keep the viewer’s account updated in terms of viewer’s 
location and preferences. The viewer may opt for the 
personalised and targeted services while signing up to the 
contract. The viewer shall be able to cancel the service 
anytime at his will. 
B. Underlying agents 
The MICAS adopts an agent-based access control 
mechanism. The agents used to ascertain security and 
interaction across the MICAS are as follows. 
The Subscription Sender agent is settled at the terminals 
(i.e. set-top box, mobile phone) and it provides a 
comprehensive graphical interface and requisite functionalities 
to satisfy the interactive use cases. For instance, it navigates 
the viewer through the sign-up wizard, generates and sends 
viewer’s subscription request to the Subscription Manager 
agent, which operates at the head-end.  
After the viewer generates his request to submit, the set-top 
box Subscription Sender agent connects to the mobile phone 
Subscription Sender agent to acquire its unique identities (i.e. 
IMSI or IMEI numbers). It then generates a message 
containing those numbers and the STB_ID and sends the 
message to the Subscription Manager. For security reasons, a 
set-top box temporary identifier (STB_TID) and Temporary 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) may be used instead of 
STB_ID and IMSI numbers. 
The Subscription Manager performs the verification 
processes, updates the viewer’s account and instructs the 
SMSS for provisioning the CA system and issuing billing 
statements. It uses the IMSI, IMEI and STB_ID (or any 
temporary number derived from those) to respectively identify 
the viewer, his mobile phone and set-top box. For security 
reasons, it may crosscheck the identifiers with the data 
manager to ascertain that they are genuine, neither reported 
stolen nor used by another viewer in the network.  
The Security agent operates at the terminals and it interacts 
with the Security Manager agent running at the head-end. 
They shall guarantee the security criteria like authentication, 
identification, privacy, integrity and non-repudiation in the 
MICAS. The Security agent is also responsible to monitor the 
viewer’s contractual behaviour and alert the Security Manager 
in case any illegal activity is detected. In case of piracy, the 
Security agent shall halt the CA functions till receiving a 
notification message from the Security Manager. The Security 
Manager compiles the alert and may ignore the event or 
automatically revoke/update the Key information or inform the 
operator of the event.  
The Conditional Access (CA) agent operates at the receiver-
end (i.e. set-top box, mobile phone). The CA agent must have 
an Operator Certificate to be run on the privilege domain(s). It 
is managed and downloaded by the CA Manager agent 
(MHSS CA Agent) operating at the head-end. The main duty 
of the CA agent lies in the control and execution of the CA 
functions (i.e. decoding or encoding the messages). The CA 
functionalities may vary depending on the security architecture 
explained later. 
The Communication agent is responsible to implement the 
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transportation protocols for exchanging the data across the 
platform. The interaction channel is formed by the GSM 
network and Bluetooth link to connect the service provider to 
the set-top box through the viewer’s mobile phone.   
The ‘initialisation step’ is referred to the mobile phone and 
set-top box pairing sequence, submission of the subscription 
request through subscriber’s mobile phone, authorisation of 
the request, identification of subscriber, validation of the set-
top box, and finally provisioning of the security mechanism in 
the mobile phone and/or set-top box. 
C. Overall system architecture 
The MICAS proposes a federal identity management system 
wherein a third party data manager works closely with parties 
that operate in the system; including a Pay-TV service 
provider, mobile phone operator, set-top box and mobile 
phone certificate issuer. The data manager manages and stores 
silos of information regarding valid SIM cards, GSM 
subscribers’ identity (i.e. IMSI), certified set-top boxes and 
Certificates, which authorise accessing to privileged locations 
in SIM cards or set-top boxes in a database. Fig. 6 presents an 
overall model of the external relationships between parties 
involved in the MICAS. 
 
Fig. 6: The MICAS business circle 
In the MICAS, the Message Handling Subsystem (MHSS) 
operates at the head-end and deals with all interactions and 
CASS installation processes in the field. It encodes/decodes 
outgoing/incoming messages and verifies the viewer’s identity 
upon receiving the subscription request through either the local 
or central database. It also updates the viewer’s accounts for 
personalisation or security matters. The MHSS forwards the 
subscription requests to the Subscriber Management 
Subsystem (SMSS). The SMSS enquiries, generates or updates 
the viewer’s account based on the subscription request, 
instructs the SAS to decide on the conditional access (CA) 
mechanism and instructs the Billing Subsystem to pursue the 
financial transactions. If the payments are authorised, the SAS 
starts responding to the CA instruction. The SAS may forward 
the Key information as a Security Object to the MHSS or as a 
CA Message to the Multiplexer, depending on the security 
architecture described later. The SMSS and SAS 
functionalities defined in the MICAS are very similar to what 
has been defined in the DVB system, except for interfacing 
with SMSS. Fig. 7 depicts a general data flow diagram in the 
MICAS.  
 
Fig. 7: The MICAS architecture  
Depending on the data delivery route and the platform, 
wherein CA message processing and content descrambling 
take place, the following security architectures can be 
supported in the MICAS [8]. 
1) Security architecture (1): This is a simple 3-level Key 
hierarchical conditional access system where the Master key is 
used to encode the EMM and Service key is used to encode 
the ECM message containing the CWs. In this model, after the 
initialisation step, the CA Manager broadcasts the CA 
messages (i.e. EMM and ECM). It also delivers the Security 
Objects (i.e. Master key and rights) to the mobile phone CA 
agent via the GSM network. The mobile CA agent transfers 
the Security Objects to the set-top box CA agent through the 
secure channel established by the Communication agent. At 
the set-top box, the CA agent decodes the EMM and extracts 
the Service key. Having checked the subscriber’s entitlements 
against the rights associated to the content (inserted in the 
ECM), the CWs are released to descramble the content.  
2)  Security architecture (2): This is similar to the previous 
model but the EMM processing takes place in the mobile 
phone. The EMM is delivered to the mobile CA agent via the 
set-top box. The mobile CA agent uses the Master key 
delivered from the GSM channel to decrypt the EMM and 
extract the Service key. The mobile CA agent then forwards 
the extracted Service key and subscriber’s rights to the set-top 
box CA agent for ECM processing.  
3) Security architecture (3): This is similar to the previous 
models but CA message processing wholly takes place in the 
mobile phone (SIM card). After initialisation step, the set-top 
box CA agent forwards the CA messages to the mobile CA 
agent over the Bluetooth link. The mobile CA agent decrypts 
the EMM and extracts the Service key using the Security 
Objects. The Service key is then used for decoding the ECM 
and extracting CWs. The CWs is sent back to the set-top box 
CA agent for descrambling the content.  
4) Security architecture (4): This is a 3-level key hierarchical 
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security system where the ECM message is broadcast over-the-
air and EMM message is sent to the subscriber’s mobile phone 
along with the Security Objects (i.e. Master Key and rights) 
via GSM network. In this model, the mobile phone is an 
intermediary to deliver the EMM and Security Objects to the 
set-top box for CA processing.  
5) Security architecture (5): This is similar to the previous 
model, but the EMM processing takes place in the subscriber’s 
mobile phone. The mobile CA agent sends the extracted 
Service key and subscriber’s rights to the set-top box CA agent 
to decode the ECM and descramble the contents.  
6) Security architecture (6): This is similar to the previous 
model, but the CA message processing takes place in the 
subscriber’s mobile phone. In this model, the set-top box plays 
an intermediary role to deliver the ECM to the mobile phone 
to extract the CW. The extracted CW is forwarded to the set-
top box for descrambling the content. 
7) Security architecture (7): This is a 2-level key hierarchical 
security system wherein the mobile is an intermediary to 
deliver Security Objects (i.e. Service Key and rights) to the 
set-top box. The set-top box receives the ECM from 
broadcasting network and deals with the CA processes and 
descrambling. 
8) Security architecture (8): This is similar to the previous 
model, but the entire CA message processing takes place in the 
mobile phone. The set-top box delivers the broadcast ECM to 
the mobile phone. The mobile CA agent extracts the CW and 
sends it to the set-top box for content descrambling. 
9) Security architecture (9): In this model, the CA message 
processing and content descrambling take place in the mobile 
phone. The content can be delivered to the mobile phone over 
either the mobile (i.e. 3G, UMTS, LTE) or broadcasting 
network via the set-top box. The communication link between 
the set-top box and mobile phone shall be then fast enough to 
display the content with no perceivable delay. Thus, popular 
Bluetooth adapters (1-3Mbps) do not seem to be suitable, 
instead, the high speed interfaces like High Speed USB 2.0 
(480Mbps), IEEE 1394 WireFire-400 or -800 (800Mbps), 
Ethernet 100Base-T (10-100Mbps) ATA-133 (1064Mbps) and 
ATA-300 (1200Mbps) can be used. Nevertheless, the recent 
high speed Bluetooth (Bluetooth V3.0) integrating the Ultra 
Wide Band (UWB) technology could be suitable as it would 
potentially enable the high data rate transfers of up to 
480Mbps.  
10) Security architecture (10): In this model, the GSM 
network is used for the delivery of the Key information and 
CA messages (i.e. ECM and EMM) to the viewer’s mobile 
phone. The decryption of the CA messages may take place at 
the mobile phone and/or set-top box. Considering all the 
combinations, the mobile phone may play an intermediary role 
to deliver both CA messages and viewer’s rights to the set-top 
box to perform full CA processing. It may also process the 
EMM message and deliver the Service key to the set-top box 
for ECM processing. Moreover, the mobile phone can be used 
to process EMM and ECM messages. In more advanced 
situations, the mobile may be considered as the CA subsystem 
processing the CA messages and descrambling the content. A 
simple model of the security architecture is considered herein 
for analysis where the CA messages are processed in the 
mobile phone and descrambling sequence takes place in the 
set-top box. 
In the security architectures explained above, the smart card 
is optional, replaced either by the viewer’s SIM card or a flash 
memory integrated within the set-top box. The next section 
explains the implementation of the MICAS reference model. 
V. REFERENCE MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
The main components in the MICAS are the Mobile phone 
and Set-top box at the receiver-end and a server (MHSS) at the 
head-end. Each of them can run different operating systems, 
but they support the fundamental Java technologies (i.e. Java 
Virtual Machine, communication and security APIs). Fig. 8 
presents the MICAS physical diagram highlighting core APIs 
needed in the MICAS. The Wireless Messaging APIs (WMA) 
can be replaced by short message commands to exchange text 
or binary messages (i.e. SMS) with MHSS through the SMS 
Service Centre (SMSC).  
 
Fig. 8: The MICAS physical diagram 
A 4-layer protocol stack is defined to handle all interactions 
between the entities in the MICAS. The implementation of the 
protocol stack in the mobile phone and set-top box very much 
depends on the security architecture and the role wherein the 
said entities are playing. Each agent forms a layer in the 
MICAS protocol stack. For instance, the Communication agent 
operating at both mobile phone and set-top box is responsible 
to establish a link between the set-top box and mobile phone. 
The Security agent at the receiver side and Security Manager 
at the head-end together perform the Authorisation, 
Authentication and Accounting (AAA) processes. The CA 
Agent and CA Manager perform conditional access functions 
by exchanging Security Objects (i.e. security Applets, Key, 
etc.) across the network. Finally, at the application layer, 
objects like the Subscription Sender and Subscription Receiver 
facilitate the subscription processes (i.e. sign-up, amendment, 
cancellation, etc.). Monitoring the subscriber’s behaviour to 
improve security and personalised services can be also defined 
as part of the application layer. Each agent is implemented as 
an object (class) and attributed with specific functions and 
relationships with other objects in and outside the MICAS. 
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Fig. 9 presents a static view of the interactive protocol stack 
used in the MICAS. 
 
Fig. 9: The interactive MICAS protocol stack 
Two ways of implementation can be considered in the 
MICAS: first, mobile centric [9] and second, set-top box 
centric implementations. In the former all the interactions are 
initiated from the mobile phone; as such the mobile phone 
presents the EPG-/ESG-like information and navigates the user 
to settle a specific request like sign-up request. The latter, on 
the other hand, is based on the set-top box and all the 
interactions are initiated and managed through the set-top box 
and TV screen. This is more analogous to the existing 
broadcasting platform, thus, it is considered herein.   
A. Communication layer 
The Communication agent in the mobile phone 
communicates with its counterparts residing at the set-top box 
and MHSS respectively via Bluetooth and GSM protocols.  
The set-top box Communication agent uses the Extended 
AT Commands to interact directly with the SIM from outside 
world [10], [11]. The AT commands [12] are sent through the 
RFCOMM-SPP over the Bluetooth link. They are exploited to 
write/read data to/from the SIM. 
The SMS protocol is used as a data bearer between the 
mobile phone and MHSS for the Remote Application 
Management (RAM) and Remote File Management (RFM) 
[13]. The MHSS sends a SMS to the SIM directly by setting 
the SMS protocol identifier (PID) to 0x7F. This method 
though is practiced by network operators to update and/or 
install SIM applications, but could be very slow for 
transferring a large volume of data. When a higher bandwidth 
is available (i.e. 3G, UMTS, EDGE), the Bearer Independent 
Protocol (BIP) can be used to quickly exchange large volume 
of data with the SIM without any intervention. The RFM is a 
kind of service that can be transferred via BIP [14].  
The mobile Communication agent is implemented as a 
J2ME MIDlet. It acts as an intermediary between the SIM and 
the outside world. It can communicate with JavaCard applets 
resided on a smart card (SIM) using the Application Protocol 
Data Unit (APDU). The communication between JavaCard 
applets and applications, hosted for instance on the mobile 
phone, are handled by the Security and Trust Services API 
(SATSA), which extends the security support for 
cryptography, digital signature services, and user credential 
management.  
B. Security layer 
The authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) is 
defined as a security protocol in the MICAS. In case of mutual 
authentication when a mobile phone is involved, the IMSI 
number (or phone number) and Bluetooth address are used to 
identify the mobile phone. The STB_ID (or MAC address) and 
its Bluetooth address are used for the set-top box 
authentication. The MHSS server is authenticated using an 
Operator-ID and his associated credential, which can be made 
available to SIM cards during manufacturing. The 
authorisation is restricted to different criteria such as time, 
location, number of requests etc. The accounting process takes 
place at the head-end where the MHSS forwards statements to 
the billing system.  
In addition to the triple-A processes, cryptographic 
techniques (i.e. hash functions, digital signature and 
encryption) are employed to provide a higher security level.  
Moreover, the session management mechanism is used to 
prevent any repetition in security processes, for instance when 
the communication link is disconnected. The session 
management is used to keep track of activities and session 
state. The session state is attributed by a session identifier (i.e. 
session ID, encryption key), which is created upon initiating 
any connection request. It is kept secret and frequently updated 
during transactions.  
In addition to the link-level security, the service-level 
security defined by developers can be used to enforce the most 
appropriate security mechanism(s) in the Bluetooth domain 
[15]. The Extensible Authentication Protocol method for GSM 
Subscriber Identity [16] can be used for authentication and 
session key distribution in the GSM domain. Nonetheless, the 
security protocol is implementation dependent. It means that 
each service provider can have his own security measures 
based upon his priorities.  
C. Conditional Access (CA) layer 
The role of the CA agents depends on the implementation 
scheme. The MHSS CA agent (CA Manager) can transfer 
Security Objects (i.e. CA-related functions, credentials) either 
directly or through an intermediary to the mobile or set-top 
box CA agents. The most suitable scheme, which is considered 
herein, is to employ both broadcasting and GSM channels. In 
this case, the MHSS CA agent will broadcast set-top box CA 
agent and/or CA-related credentials (i.e. EMM, ECM) to set-
top boxes using an object carousel. It also loads the mobile CA 
agent and/or CA credentials (i.e. Master Key) on the SIM card 
using the Over-the-Air (OTA) technology in the GSM 
network.  
The MHSS CA agent sends Service-requests (application 
message) to an OTA Gateway that transforms the requests into 
Short Message Services (SMS) to be sent to a SIM card. The 
Service-requests contain a secured command packet (i.e. 
LOAD, MODIFY, ACTIVATE FILE, DEACTIVATE FILE), 
the targeted subscriber and data to perform the service. The 
service provider may set the Security Parameter Indicator 
(SPI) in the command packet to get a direct acknowledgement 
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from the recipient. The response will be sent back within a 
secured response packet which conveys a Status Code 
indicating if the packets have been received intact. Similarly, 
the service provider may retrieve data from the SIM card(s) for 
security or personalisation purposes [13].  
The set-top box CA agent is downloaded to the viewer’s set-
top box when the receiver is connected to the service 
provider’s network for the first time. The CA agent starts 
automatically as the receiver starts, until it is upgraded or the 
receiver is connected to a different network. The CA agent can 
be broadcast as an unbound application in OCAP-compliant 
network or a stored application in MHP-compliant network. 
Nevertheless, it is developed as an Xlet (applet for consumer 
systems) which forms the basis for all JavaTV-compliant 
systems including Multimedia Home Platform (MHP) and 
OCAP. The Xlet interface is used by the service provider to 
control the agent’s life-cycle.  
The signalling tables are included in the transport streams to 
instruct a set-top box on when and how to launch set-top box 
CA agent. Currently, the Globally Executable MHP (GEM), 
MHP and OCAP standards use eXtended AIT (XAIT) to 
describe stored or unbound applications [17]. The CA agent is 
described in an XAIT table as shown in Table 1.  
TABLE 1 
CA AGENT XAIT DESCRIPTION FIELD 
Application name CA agent 
Application version v.1.0 
ID of application and 
associated organisation 
Application ID = 1, Organisation ID = 1;  
Application status AUTOSTART 
Application type Xlet 
In addition to the XAIT, the Conditional Access Table 
(CAT) needs to be modified to determine the used encryption 
method(s), conditional access management and entitlements 
(i.e. EMM). 
D. Application layer 
This handles all interactions that take place between a 
viewer and set-top box (local interactions), and between a 
viewer and service provider (interactions over return channel). 
In both cases, native or stored (unbound) applications, which 
are broadcast and/or downloaded to a set-top box, will be 
used.  
It is assumed that each set-top box has a built-in navigator 
or Monitor Application (or Execution Engine) as are usual for 
the MHP-compliant and OCAP-compliant systems, 
respectively. In the MICAS, the navigator enables a viewer to 
control the set-top box and set-up a Bluetooth connection 
between the set-top box and his/her mobile phone. Also, it 
displays a list of available service provider(s) and their 
associated services as advertised by EPG. Thus, the viewer can 
browse the list of programmes and build up his subscription 
request(s). After fulfilling the subscription process, the service 
provider may download a tailored navigator and/or module(s) 
(i.e. for handling the CA messages) to the viewer’s set-top 
box.  
In addition to the DVB-PSI/SI signalling tables and EPG, in 
the MICAS, additional data are required for online 
subscription, which is called Subscription Association Table 
(SAT). The SAT advertises available service provider(s) and 
their services to which TV consumers can subscribe. When a 
viewer attempts to sign-up, the SAT is displayed on the TV 
screen for instance in a cascading form.  
The subscription request contains three sections: subscriber 
details, order details (i.e. order code, preferences, mobile 
phone and set-top box details) and terms and conditions. The 
subscriber’s details are kept secret during the transition and 
processing in the MICAS, as such some or whole part of the 
subscription message (or any message of this type) is encoded. 
The content itself is transformed via the Base64 encoding 
algorithm. The 1Kbyte subscription request after Base64 
transformation will become as large as a 5Kbyte text file. After 
transformation, the resulting file is compressed up to 40% 
using arithmetic compression methods. The digest value is 
then calculated using the SHA1 algorithm. The digest value 
needs to be signed for instance using the RSA encoding 
method. The output of the signature will vary depending on the 
private key and size of the key (i.e. 2048, 1024, 512 bits). The 
public key and/or certification number will be known to the 
recipient to re-calculate the digest value and decode the 
subscription request.  
The Amendment request is similar to the Subscription 
request especially when a viewer wishes to extend his 
entitlements by adding more services into his subscription 
profile. However, it may include a cancellation request 
concerning some or all parts of his subscription profile in that 
the requested services needs to be specified clearly. 
The Follow Me activation request includes the viewer’s 
identity (i.e. IMSI), the STB_ID and optionally the activation 
period. The activation period can be pre-determined by the 
service provider (i.e. one day) and then extended on demand. 
The Follow Me service will be automatically cancelled when it 
is due or upon the viewer’s cancellation request or when the 
service provider detects that the viewer is no longer using the 
set-top box for viewing (i.e. when he logs into another set-top 
box or changes his location).  
One of the cross-platform solutions to implement MICAS-
related interactive applications is employing the JavaTV APIs 
(i.e. javax.tv.xlet) The JavaTV is compatible with other 
standards and provides high degree of control and flexibility 
over functionalities unique to television receivers. The 
javax.xml.crypto package also provides sufficient APIs to 
create and sign XML formatted messages. More information 
can be found in the Sun Microsystems’ website 
(java.sun.com). 
In the next section, the MICAS security architectures are 
briefly analysed. 
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VI. ANALYSIS 
The analysis pursued here is based on those factors, which 
play important role in developing a comprehensive business 
case for the MICAS. The factors are quantified to 
approximately identify the best MICAS security architecture. 
A. Security 
The determination of risk for a particular threat-
vulnerability pair can be expressed as a function of the 
likelihood of a given threat-source’s attempting to exercise a 
given vulnerability [19]: 
1) The magnitude of the impact, should a threat-source 
successfully exercise the vulnerability; 
2) The final determination of mission risk is derived by 
multiplying the ratings assigned for threat likelihood (e.g., 
probability) and threat impact. 
To measure the risk, a risk scale and risk-level matrix are 
developed. The standard risk level matrix includes the threat 
likelihood and impact of the threat. In order to determine the 
likelihood of exercising a potential vulnerability in a given 
security architecture, the following factors can be taken into 
account:  
1) Threat-source motivation and capability; 
2) Nature of the vulnerability; 
3) Effectiveness of possible controls. 
The threat likelihood can be rated in three levels: High 
(1.0); Medium (0.5) and Low (0.1). Table 2 presents the risk 
measurement criteria considered herein. 
TABLE 2 
RISK SCALE DEFINITIONS 
Risk level Risk description and necessary action 
High The system may continue to operate, but a 
corrective action plan must be put in place as 
soon as possible 
Medium Corrective actions are needed and a plan must 
be developed to incorporate these actions 
within a reasonable period of time 
Low The service provider must determine whether 
corrective actions are still required or decide to 
accept the risk 
The adverse impact of a security event can be described in 
terms of loss or degradation of any, or a combination of any, 
of the following three security goals: integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality. The impact is rated in three levels of High 
(10), Medium (5) and Low (1). Table 3 presents the impact 
measurement criteria considered herein. 
TABLE 3 
IMPACT MAGNITUDE DEFINITIONS 
Magnitude of impact Definition of impact 
High Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the highly costly loss of major tangible assets 
or resources; (2) may significantly violate, 
harm, or impede a Pay-TV service provider’s 
objective, reputation, or interest 
Medium Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the costly loss of tangible assets or resources; 
(2) may violate, harm, or impede a Pay-TV 
service provider’s mission, reputation, or 
interest 
Low Exercise of the vulnerability (1) may result in 
the loss of some tangible assets or resources or 
(2) may noticeably affect a Pay-TV service 
provider’s mission, reputation, or interest 
Analysis reveals that the attack implies the least impact in 
the architectures 3, 6, 8 and 10 where the Master key and 
Service key are stored in the SIM and only CWs are exposed 
on the Bluetooth link. However, the high frequency of CWs 
makes the piracy difficult. But, the architecture numbered 9 is 
attributed as the most vulnerable architecture as it exposes the 
actual contents on the Bluetooth channel. Fig. 10 presents the 
tendency of risk assessment in the MICAS security 
architectures.  
 
Fig. 10: The risk analysis of MICAS security architectures 
B. Complexity 
The overall complexity of the MICAS architectures is 
calculated based on the following measures: 
3) Emergent complexity: This can be defined as the 
complexity of the system from a viewer’s point of view. A 
survey was carried out on groups of people (i.e. 50 
people) to evaluate the emergent complexity in the 
MICAS based on the use case scenarios explained before. 
The observers were random from different ages (i.e. 
between 15 to 60 years) and high-tech literacy (i.e. 
mobile, computer) and their view was counted as equally 
weighted.  Fig. 11 shows the emergent complexity index 
in the MICAS architectures based on the results of the 
survey. 
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Fig. 11: The emergent complexity index in the MICAS security architecture 
4) Interdependencies: The complexity of architectures 
partially depends on the interdependency of the modules 
so that it makes the system partially decomposable; 
5)  CA message handling: The complexity of CA systems 
chiefly depends on the design of EMM injector at the 
head-end and design of CA subsystem at the receiver-end.  
In the first layer of analysis, a simple comparison amid 
architectures can be deducted to realise which solution is less 
complex for implementation. For instance, an architecture in 
which EMM messages must be broadcast timely in a uni-
directional network is more complex than an architecture 
which adopts point-to-point message delivery method. In-
depth analysis of algorithms is deferred to the future.  
The result of the survey emphasises on implementing user-
friendly interactive applications to enable viewers readily go 
through the MICAS use-cases. It also necessitates that the 
interdependency of return channel elements (i.e. MHSS, 
mobile phone, set-top box) needs to be mitigated to relieve the 
viewer from being bound to the set-top box or mobile phone. 
As the interdependency strictly related to the key management 
and distribution schemes, the less frequent contact is made 
over the GSM route the less interdependency is required 
amidst the elements. Finally, the CA-related complexity at the 
head-end and receiver-end (i.e. set-top box) will be lessened if 
the mobile phone is incorporated in CA processing. Fig. 12 
shows the average of complexity in the MICAS security 
architectures considering the emergent, interdependency and 
CA-related complexity factors.  
 
Fig. 12: The complexity assessment of MICAS security architectures 
C. Set-top box cost model 
An important factor to convince stakeholders to invest in a 
technology is the deployment cost and rate of return. The rate 
of return is very much related to customers’ response to the 
technology. In-depth analysis of all business driven factors can 
be deferred to the future. Nevertheless, the overall cost of set-
top boxes which might be attractive to the set-top box 
producers and viewers are briefly discussed here.  
There are various factors that play a role in the total price of 
a set-top box, but we account the components cost as the basis 
for our analysis. The front-end set-top box components (i.e. 
tuner, demodulator, de-multiplexer) are required in all MICAS 
architectures. The CA subsystem (i.e. filter, CA module, 
smartcard, descrambler) may differ depending on the 
architecture. The back-end components (i.e. decoder) are also 
similar in all of the architectures. Amid the common interfaces 
(i.e. RJ-11, RS232, HDMI/DVI, 802.11, USB, etc), only 
Bluetooth is essential for all architectures.  
It is appreciated that components like descrambler can be 
more expensive than others and also some architectures 
require more sophisticated firmware/memory resources to 
handle CA processing. But, the cost differentiation in the 
hardware components integrated in the set-top box, the 
firmware and memory differentiation costs are considered 
negligible amid security architectures here. Fig. 13 presents 
the cost analysis of the set-top box used in MICAS 
architecture. 
 
Fig. 13: The production cost analysis in the MICAS security architectures 
The analysis suggests that incorporating the mobile 
technology into the Pay-TV system can potentially reduce 
number of the hardware components and overall cost of the 
set-top box.  
D.  Overall analysis 
A pre-deployment evaluation of security risk analysis, 
complexity and set-top box cost model can help develop a 
more comprehensive business case for the MICAS security 
architectures. The following formula is used to present the 
overall pre-deployment measurement based on the security 
risk, complexity and cost. 
100
1
% 


CostComplexityskSecurityRi
ePerformanc  
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Fig. 14 presents the overall performance of MICAS security 
architectures based on the security, complexity and cost 
assessments. 
 
Fig. 14: The performance analysis of the MICAS security architectures 
The security architecture numbered 9 is the lowest and 10 is 
the best performer. The architecture numbered 1 with 
minimum deviation from average performance can be a viable 
solution based on the said criteria. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The utilisation of mobile technology in the Pay-TV system 
can enhance interactivity, security and potentially reduce 
customer attrition and operational cost. It breaks up the rigid 
relationship between a viewer and set-top box so that a viewer 
can fully enjoy his entitlements via an arbitrary set-top box.  
Having thoroughly considered state-of-the-art 
communication and access control technologies, the paper 
presented a set of conventional use-cases to clarify the design 
and implementation aspects of the novel Mobile Integrated 
Conditional Access System (MICAS). The MICAS has been 
proposed to address the inherited issues in the Pay-TV mainly 
interoperability, mobility, personalisation, cost of operation, 
viewer’s convenience by providing a viable and intelligent 
platform which supports a horizontal transaction model and 
can fulfil future demands in the Pay-TV and interactive-TV 
businesses. The MICAS design was enriched by providing 
possible security structures and data flow diagrams supported 
thereby. A business collaboration structure was proposed 
followed by an implementation reference model. Finally, the 
security architectures were analysed to propose the best 
architecture on the basis of the pre-deployment performance 
criteria namely the security, complexity and set-top box 
production cost. The analysis reveals that the best pre-
deployment performance can be gained when the cellular 
network is used for CA message delivery (including ECM and 
EMM) and CA subsystem is shifted to the mobile phone from 
the set-top box; a SIM-based CA system for Pay-TV systems. 
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